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STUDENT NOTES
Constitutional Law - Martial Law - Preserving Order in the
State: A Traditional Reappraisal
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years Americans have witnessed numerous human phe-
nomena variously described as "riots", "protests", "insurrections",
"demonstrations" and, in general, "disorders."' The dialogue gen-
erated by these incidents has been lengthy and heated; scholarly com-
ment2 has been abundant. Lawmakers at the federal, state and
municipal levels have hastened to take decisive action that would
prevent reoccurrences of such disintegration in societal law and order.
3
One complicating factor in discussing disorders is the various
ways in which they occur. Some have been violent,4 and others have
I Detailed accounts of riotous activities and other disorders up to and
including the summer of 1967 are compiled and analyzed in REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISsION ON CnL DisoRDRs (1968) [hereinafter cited
as CIVIL DIsoRDERs]. Disturbances and disorders at colleges and universities are
enumerated and discussed in THE REPORT OF THE PREsiDENT's CONMavSSION ON
CAMPUs UNREST (1970) [hereinafter cited as CAMwus UNREST].
2 E.g., Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 Iowa L. Rpv. 1 (1971); Murray, Civil
Disturbances, Justifiable Homicide and Military Law, 54 MnL. L. REV. 129
(1971); Mutter, Some Observations on Military Involvement in Domestic Dis-
orders, 29 FED. BJ. 59 (1968); Waranoff, Federal Judicial Control of the Na-
tional Guard, 52 B.U.L. Rav. 1 (1972); Weiner, Martial Law Today, 55
A.B.A.J. 723 (1969); Comment, Power of a Governor to Proclaim Martial Law
and Use State Military Forces to Suppress Campus Demonstrations, 59 KY.
LJ. 547 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Proclaim Martial Law]; Comment, Consti-
tutional and Statutory Bases of Governor's Emergency Powers, 64 MIca. L.
REv. 290 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Governor's Emergency Powers]; Com-
ment, Martial Law, 42 S. CL. L. REv. 546 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Martial Law].
3 The President's Commission that investigated civil disorders in the after-
math of the summer of 1967 strongly urged state governments to reevaluate
and revise satte laws concerning control of civil disturbances. CsVu. DisoRDERs,
supra note 1, at 288-91. The West Virginia Legislature subsequently amended
the West Virginia Riot Control Law in 1969. W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 6 §§ 1-5
(Michie Supp. 1972), amending W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 6 §§ 1-5 (Michie
1966). For a discussion of this law see Comment, Criminal Law - West Vir-
ginia Riot Law, 72 W. VA. L. REv. 99 (1970). Congress also revised the Civil
Disorders Riot Provisions of the Federal Criminal Code in 1968. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 231-32, 2101-02 (1970). The constitutionality of the amended provisions
was upheld in National Mobilization Comm'n v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934 (7th
Cir. 1969).
4 Violence occurred in Newark and Plainfield, New Jersey. N.Y. Times,
July 20, 1967, at 1, col. 8 (city ed.); Cwm Disonjnns, supra note 1, at 30-46.
Disorder also erupted in Detroit, Michigan, Cwm DisoRDERs supra note 1, at
47-61.
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been nonviolent.5 Some have been random, unplanned and sporadi-
cally unpredictable, 6 while others have evidenced considerable prior
planning and detailed strategy on the part of the actors.7 Some have
been ephemeral, isolated and readily confined to a small area;8 others
have encompassed larger territory for extended periods of time.9 In
each instance, however, the disorder has been met by some degree of
discretionary governmental action in the executive branch. 0 Executive
action has, to some extent, involved force." In large scale disorders,
the peacekeeping forces of several governmental units have been em-
ployed to maintain or restore the peace.' 2 Overall, governmental reac-
tions have varied from utilizing all available local police to the more
serious response of augmenting the local authorities with state and
federal military forces.'3 The trend is clearly toward increased gov-
ernmental recourse to military force, resulting in frequent confronta-
tion between citizens and the National Guard. 14
5 Essentially non-violent student demonstrations occurred in Illinois, Mary-
land, New Mexico, Wisconsin, Ohio and Kentucky in the aftermath of the in-
vasion of Cambodia by U.S. military forces. See NEWSWEEK, May 18, 1970,
at 28-30. In these six states, the Governors instituted martial law to quell stu-
dent disorders. For a detailed account of the institution of martial law at the
University of Kentucky see Proclaim Martial Law, supra note 2.6 The Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders observed, "they [riots] are
unusual, irregular, complex, and, in the present state of knowledge, unpre-
dictable social processes. Like many human events, they do not unfold in
orderly sequences." CIvIL DisoRmmis, supra note 1, at 63. The Commission
concluded that, "[o]n the basis of all the information collected, ... the urban
disorders of the summer of 1967 were not caused by, nor were they the con-
sequence of, any organized plan or 'conspiracy."' Id. at 89.
7The May Day demonstrations in Washington, D.C., in 1971, evidenced
considerable prior planning in the designation of key points within the city to
disrupt traffic flow. N.Y. Times, May 5, 1971, at 26, col. 3 (city ed.). Con-
trary to the conclusions reached by the Advisory Commission on Civil Disor-
ders, the House of Representative's Un-American Activities Committee
(subsequently renamed the Internal Security Committee) defined the riot sit-
uations of 1967 as planned "civil revolts," insurrectionary in scope and a pre-
liminary phase of "guerrilla warfare," organized and planned by black militants
in collaboration with domestic and foreign Communist groups. HousE COMM.
ON UN-AMERICAN AcTVrns, GuERRILLA WARRE ADVOCATES IN THE UNITED
STATE, H.R. REP. No. 1351, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-61 (1968). See also
Crmv DIsoRDERs, supra note 1.
8 Generally speaking, campus demonstrations during the spring of 1971
were confined to small areas. CAMPus UNREsT, supra note 1, at 3.
9 he Advisory Commission listed eight disorders as "major." These were
characterized by fires, looting, reports of sniping, and violence lasting more
than two days, as well as the use of National Guard or Federal forces in addi-
tion to other local authorities. These included disorders at Buffalo, N.Y.; Cin-
cinnati, Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; Milwaukee, Wis.; Minneapolis, Minn.; Newark
and Plainfield, NJ.; and Tampa, Fla. CiviL DIsoRDERs, supra note 1, at 65.
10 CVu DISORDERS, supra note 1, at 71-72.
11 Id. at 171-81, 267-91.
12 Id.
13Id.
14 From the end of World War 11 through February, 1968, the National
[Vol. 75
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The purpose of this note is to examine the sources, scope, and
limits inherent in the exercise of discretionary executive authority to
preserve or restore domestic order in the face of insurrections or riots.
Underlying the political debate on the proper role of the executive in
preserving domestic order, is the fundamental query: What is the
proper balance to be struck between the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the individual and the right of the state to take action neces-
sary to effectuate and maintain its existence? The increased reliance on
state and federal military force to preserve domestic tranquility under-
lines serious constitutional questions. Generally, the use of military
force has been justified as a proper exercise of the executive authority
to proclaim martial law.'5 Additional questions are presented because
there is considerable confusion surrounding martial law; historically,
the term has been used to refer to a myriad of diverse occasions. "Mar-
tial law", in its most comprehensive sense, refers to law that is promul-
gated and administered by military authorities and agencies to preserve
public order, protect persons, and defend property in areas wherein
civil government is unable to function.'6
The use of the military in times of domestic crisis is a common
technique of state government.' 7 The military forces of West Virginia
have been called out for state duty numerous times in this century;
martial law has been declared twice.'8 Essentially, this note will focus
on the constitutional and statutory power available to the Governor
Guard was summoned to supplement local police authorities in controlling
domestic disturbances approximately one hundred times in thirty-three States.
Eighteen of these occurred from June through August, 1967. Id, at 274. From
January, 1968, to May, 1970, the National Guard was employed on 324 sep-
erate occasions to quell varying degrees of civil disorders. 116 CONG. Ruc.
27,339 (daily ed. May 4, 1970); CAMwus UNREsT, supra note 2, at 174.
Is Martial Law, supra note 2, at 547-49.
16C. FAuudAN, THE LAw op MATrAL RuLE 43 (1930) [hereinafter cited
as FAumAN].
17Note 14, supra. See FAnauAN, supra note 16, at 67-90, 138-62; R.
RANKIN, WHEN CroL LAw FAnms 65-173 (1939) [hereinafter cited as RANKI].
18 Martial law was first invoked to deal with the Paint Creek-Cabin Creek
strike situation in West Virginia during 1912 and 1913. C. AMBLER and F.
SUMMERS, WEST VIRGMN - THE MouNTAIN STATE 448-52 (2d ed. 1958).
The second instance in which martial law was proclaimed occurred during a
period of labor violence in Mingo County in 1921 and 1922. Id. at 454-60. Of
the first instance, it has been said: "In the history of the United States, martial
law has never been used on so broad a scale, in so drastic a manner, nor upon
such sweeping principles as in West Virginia in 1912-13 during the Paint Creek
trouble. . .[it was an example of] absolute martial law with all its force."
RANKIN, supra note 17, at 85. See also Ballantine, Military Dictatorship in
California and West Virginia, 1 CALW. L. REv. 413 (1913). For historical and
political commentary see Lynch, The West Virginia Coal Strike, 29 POL. SCi. Q.
626 (1914).
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of West Virginia to call forth the National Guard to implement martial
law and emergency measures short of martial law.
1]'. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS: WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A. The West Virginia Constitution
The West Virginia constitution is similar to those of most states
that have not undertaken revision since the late nineteenth century. 9
The constitution directs the Governor to insure that the laws are
faithfully executed. 0 Additionally, the chief executive is designated as
commander-in-chief of the military forces of the state and, conse-
quently, authorized to "call out the same [militia] to execute the laws,
suppress insurrection and repel invasion. 2
Martial law is not defined or specifically mentioned in the con-
stitution. In one important provision, however, martial law is recog-
nized by implication: "[N]o citizen, unless engaged in the military
service of the State, shall be tried or punished by any military court,
for any offense that is cognizable by the civil courts of the State.'"
2
Under martial law, military forces perform the functions of civil
government, including replacement of the civil courts by military tri-
bunals. This constitutional admonition implies that under no circum-
stances can a citizen be tried by the military for a crime over which a
functioning civilian tribunal has jurisdiction.
The constitution also declares that "[tihe provisions of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and of this State, are operative alike in
a period of war as in time of peace, and any departure therefrom, or
violation thereof, under the plea of necessity, or any other plea, is
subversive of good government, and tends to anarchy and despo-
tism."23 The import of this section is clear; regardless of extraneous
events, no provision of either the federal or the state constitution may
19 Governor's Emergency Powers, supra note 2.
20 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
21 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 12. Thirty-five state constitutions explicitly
confer this authority on the Governor. The constitutions of the remaining fifteen
states do not. One of the fifteen, Tennessee, specifically forbids the use of such
power by the Governor, stating that the use of the military is "[fforbidden...
except in case of rebellion or invasion and then only when the legislature shall
declare by law, that the public safety requires it." TENN. CoNsr. art. III, § 5.
See, Governor's Emergency Power, supra note 2, at 290-93.
22 W. VA. CONsr. art. ILT, § 12.
23 W. VA. CONsr. art. I, § 3.
[Vol. 75
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be disregarded. Due process is afforded constitutional protection.24
Interestingly, the West Viriginia constitution, in contrast with the
United States Constitution, dictates that the "privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus shall not be suspended. '25 The language is unequivocal;
there is nothing left to discretionary interpretation. No branch of state
government has the lawful authority to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.26 Finally, the constitution commands that "[tjhe military shall
be subordinate to the civil power ....
B. West Virginia Statutory Provisions
The constitutional limitations on the Governor's power to act in
maintaining or restoring order have received scant legislative recogni-
tion. The same cannot be said of those constitutional provisions direct-
ing the executive to faithfully execute the laws of the state, or recog-
nizing the Governor as the commanding officer of the state's military
forces. The Governor is granted nearly unbridled discretion to appre-
hend and imprison persons at war with the United States or West
Virginia.28 The expansive nature of executive authority is evidenced
by the statute empowering the Governor to
cause to be apprehended and imprisoned all who in time of
war, insurrection or public danger shall willfully give aid,
support or information to the enemy or insurgents, or who,
he shall have just cause to believe, are conspiring or combin-
ing together to aid or support any hostile action against the
United States or this State.
29
Most striking is the failure of the legislature to define "public danger"
or set forth any standards to guide the Governor in formulating
"beliefs" regarding "conspiracies" against the state. It is of more than
passing importance to ponder how the state, without any initial action
24 W. VA. CONST. art. 11, § 10.
25 W. VA. CONsT. art. Ell, § 4. The United States Constitution provides
that "the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, un-
less when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it:"
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
26 The expanded scope of habeas corpus relief in federal courts renders
state action under the state constitution largely irrelevant. Even if the executive
or legislature of a state were to suspend the state writ of habeas corpus, there
would still be recourse to the federal courts. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
27 W. VA. CONSr. art. Ill, § 12. With the lone exception of New York, a
similarly worded provision is found in all state constitutions. Governors Emer-
gency Powers, supra note 2, at 294.
28 W. VA. CODE ch. 5, art. 1, §§ 1-3 (Michie 1966).
29 Id. at § 2 (emphasis added).
5
Roark: Constitutional Law--Martial Law--Preserving Order in the State: A
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
by the federal government, may be at war, since the constitutional
prerogative of declaring war is within the power of Congress 0 In any
case, little clarification of the extent of the Governor's power is af-
forded by analysis of statutes implementing the constitutional grants
of executive power.' "In event of war, insurrection, rebellion, inva-
sion, tumult, riot, mob or body of men acting together by force with
intent to commit a felony," or where there is imminent danger that
such events might occur, the Governor has the authority to call on the
National Guard to perform whatever duties he may consider neces-
sary.32 At the occurrence of a public disaster or emergency, there is
executive authority to declare a limited emergency in the area affected
and to delegate such authority as the Governor deems necessary and
expedient to the National Guard commander.33 In such instances, the
National Guard is directed to "coordinate and direct" the activities of
all persons in the affected area, including organizations engaging in
relief or evacuation activities.3 4
3 0 Action by the state executive, claiming justification under the Governor's
"war powers," clearly presents a federal question. While it may be surprising
to discuss "war powers" of the Governor, "since 1912 West Virginia has had
four 'wars' by proclamation of the governor, and war powers were success-
fully claimed in Montana, Nebraska and Texas." FAmmAN, supra note 16, at
103. However, the United States Constitution states "[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of Congress ... engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Reference to the Articles of Confederation, to drafts of the Constitution,
and to early acts of Congress, lead to the conclusion that the true intent of the
constitutional prohibition is that a state may not wage war except in the two
instances cited. By "invasion," the danger most immediately considered was an
"Indian invasion." FAmMAN, supra note 16, at 104. It seems clear that the
states are denied the power to declare war. Therefore, a Governor's authority
to "rule" by martial law is not derived from his "war powers." FAJRMAN, supra
note 16, at 100-05. See New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90 (1883).
31 W. VA. CODE ch. 15, art. ID, §§ 1-5, 14 (Michie 1966).32 W. VA. CODE Ch. 15, art. 1D, § 1 (Michie 1966). A major difficulty
with these statutory provisions is the lack of any statutory or judicial defini-
tions. For example, in the absence of legislative clarification, "insurrection,""tumult,". "riot," and "mob" are left to long-existing common law definition.
There is authority to support the proposition that any direct violence against
the government is insurrectionary. See, In re Charge to Grand Jury, 62 F. 828,
830 (N.D. Ill. 1894). One case requires that the violence occur with the intent
to overthrow the government. Home Insurance Co. v. Davila, 212 F.2d 731,
736 (1st Cir. 1954).
In West Virginia, a "riot" is defined by reference to the common law.
Generally, a "riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of vio-
lence, either with or without a common cause or quarrel... ." State v. Wool-
dridge, 129 W. Va. 448, 470, 40 S.E.2d 899, 911 (1946).
33 W. VA. CODE ch. 15, art. ID, § 2 (Michie 1966). This statute specifi-
cally provides that "[n]othing contained in this section shall be construed to
limit or deny the authority of the governor to declare martial law."
34These statutory provisions fail to provide guidelines for coordinating
the activities of the National Guard with local authorities. Nor are there stat-
utory provisions stating what the Governor may specifically order the mobilized
[Vol. 75
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In case of "invasion, insurrection, rebellion or riot, flood or other
public disorder or emergency," the Governor is granted the discre-
tionary authority to proclaim martial law, and such a proclamation
may include such powers as the Governor, in his discretion, deter-
mines necessary to "meet the exigencies of the situation."'3- Martial law
may be declared in any "towns, cities, districts or counties" where the
disorder exists.1
6
These statutory provisions raise constitutional questions of con-
siderable magnitude. The specific problem is whether the provisions
are consistent with the constitutional prohibition against the trial of
citizens in military courts for offenses cognizable by the civil courts. In
addition, it must be determined whether these statutory powers can
be squared with the constitutional mandate that both the state and
federal constitutions are always operative in time of war and peace,
and that the "plea of necessity, or any other plea" cannot be involved
as justification for its violation. As a corrollary, there must be a deter-
mination whether an "exigency of the situation" is equivalent to a
"plea of necessity." Perhaps, in light of the trend sanctioning increased
reliance on the discretionary authority of the governor to maintain and
insure domestic order,37 West Virginia's constitutional prohibitions are
simply carry-overs from some distant past. Since the West Virginia
troops to do. Likewise, there is no legislative specification of the Guard's role,
vis-h-vis other law enforcement agencies, particularly local police authorities.
35 W. VA. CODc ch. 15, art. 1D, § 14 (Michie 1966). This power, as in-
dicated, is statutory. Its existence can only be implied from the West Virginia
constitution. See W. VA. CoNsr. art. III, § 12. Only Alaska and Rhode Island
specifically confer constitutional authority upon the Governor to declare mar-
tial law. ALAS. CoNsr. art. III, § 20; RI. CoNsr. art. I, § 18.36
In West Virginia, the circuit courts exercise jurisdiction over at least
one county. See W. VA. CoNsr. art. VIII, §§ 1, 10-13. Unless the civil courts
are unable to function, it is questionable whether the Governor has the au-
thority to declare martial law in a town or district, except in instances when
the circuit court is located therein. However, such a result has been upheld.
Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); In re Jones, 71 W.
Va. 567, 77 SE. 1029 (1913); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519,
77 S.E. 243 (1912).
A different result was reached in New Castle, Indiana, in 1955, during a
labor dispute. The Govornor proclaimed a state of emergency and designated
the city and county, which was the focus of the violence, a military district,
thereby establishing martial law. The circuit court judge of the county imme-
diately abdicated his bench, refused to hold court, and contended that neither
he nor the court had any legal status under a declaration of martial law. The
judge grounded his action on the proposition that, if the Governor's action was
legal the court could no longer exist and, furthermore, the court could not
exist under the Indiana constitutional provision which commanded that the
military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power; moreover, the
court could not be reincarnated by executive order or sufferance of the military.
IND. CoNsr. art. I, § 33. See, Note, Rule By Martial Law in Indiana: The Scope
of Executive Power, 31 IND. LJ. 456, 460 n.23 (1956).37 See note 14, supra.
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constitution and its corresponding statutes fail to define "martial law"
or the circumstances necessary for its institution, clarification must lie
elsewhere. Neither the United States Constitution nor the federal
statutes, define "martial law."38 The definitions enunciated by state
and federal courts compound this confusion 9 Consequently, as a
precedent for understanding the intricacies of martial law, it is essen-
tial to start at the beginning-Olde English Common Law.40
II. MARTIAL LAW ISTORICALLY CONSIDERED
A. Olde English Common Law
Various systems of law coexisted in medieval England. In addi-
tion to common law and equity there existed the canon law, admiralty
law, and marshall law. "Each of these rival jurisdictions had its own
court or courts."14' As early as 1181, Henry II created a standing force
of citizen-soldiers to supplement the regular feudal army. This was
called the jurata ad arma and was the forerunner of today's local
militia or National Guard.42 Initially, supervision of the "regular"
feudal army was the prerogative of the Earl Marshall of England; the
jurata ad arma was directed by the King's Constable. 43 By the mid-
fourteenth century, these separate jurisdictions were combined to form
the Court of Constable and Marshall. As an independent tribunal, it
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the discipline of the armed forces
of Britain, both the civilian and regular armies, whenever they were
led off to war.44 The jurata ad arma were also used for domestic
purposes. When so used, they were legally considered to be aides of
the sheriff and subject to the ordinary courts, governed by the devel-
38 See generally Poe, The Use of Federal Troops to Suppress Domestic
Violence, 54 A.B.A.J. 168-70 (1968); Comment, Executive Power and Due
Process: Demonstration, Riot and Insurrection, 6 Housr. L. Rv. 882, 894-902
(1969).39 RUMX, supra note 17, at 173-205; FAiRMAN, supra note 16, at 239-44.
Even in West Virginia the judicial pronouncements are inconsistent. Compare
Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.E. 428 (1921), with State ex rel.
Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).40 U. Colo L. Revision Center, A Comprehensive Study of the Use of
Military Troops in Civil Disorders With Proposals for Legislative Reform, 43
U. CoLo. L. REv. 399, 421-430 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Study].
41 FAutmAN, supra note 16, at 2.
42 In its capacity as citizen-soldiers, the jurata ad arma later came to be
known as the posse comitatus, a term more familiar to American jurisprudence.
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oping precepts of the maturing common law.45 Only when used in time
of actual war, was this citizen force subject to the Marshall's law.4'
The fifteenth century witnessed a novel jurisprudence called the
Law of Star Chamber; the Marshall's law was used effectively to
eclipse the tenets of due process of law.4 7 As a result of this abuse of
the citizenry by military force, the Restoration government declared
that the jurata ad arma, which had become known as the posse comi-
tatus, was to be considered distinct from the militia. The militia could
only be used in time of actual war, insurrection, rebellion, or inva-
sion.48 As a result, the Bill of Rights of 1689 unequivocally declared
that the Crown had no power to use the posse against English citi-
zens.
49
Consistent with the principles of due process and ordinary
civilian law, the Riot Act of 1714 was enacted. 0 Suppression of riots
and apprehension of offenders were to be effected by ordinary local
officers, such as the mayor and sheriff, assisted as needed by the
posse. Those arrested were tried by the ordinary courts. Additionally,
Parliament affirmed use of the militia, in times of "insurrection,"
"rebellion" and "invasion," but these situations were distinguished
45 Id.
46 It is Engdahl's conclusion that pre-fourteenth century precedents estab-
lished, as integral to the concept of due process, the principle that expedient
recourse to force, appropriate in war, has no place in civilian situations, unless
the courts cannot function. "A line was drawn between war and civil distur-
bances, and between sheer force and due process of law . . . which would
tolerate no infringement by martial law." Id. at 7.
47F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 260-70
(1908).
48 Civil officers and the posse comitatus were to be used to deal with do-
mestic disturbances, but only in accordance with due process of law. Use of
the military was reserved for actual warfare. Although historically the posse
and the militia were one and the same, henceforth they were viewed differ-
ently and as separate entities.
49 Engdahl, supra note 2, at 16. Never in time of peace, so long as the or-
dinary civil courts were functioning, was the government to resort to the armed
forces to quell domestic turbulence; accordingly, it could not take recourse to
martial law.
50 Id. Essentially, this Act provided that in the event of a riot, the mayor,
sheriff, or other civil magistrate should proceed to the scene of the disturbance
and read aloud a proclamation to the crowd, ordering them to disperse. Rioters
who remained were guilty of a felony and subject to punishment by the ordinary
courts of the common law.
51 Criminal Law -West Virginia Riot Law, supra note 3, at 100. The
West Virginia Riot Act, as amended, is a product of three principal sources:
the English Common Law, the English Riot Law of 1714, and the Virginia
Riot Law of 1848. Most states' riot laws are substantially patterned after the
English act of 1714.
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from mere "unlawful, riotous and tumultuous assemblies."52 Only
while engaged in actual service were members of the militia subject to
martial law, then consisting of the military law governing regular
armed forces.53 More importantly, the postulates applicable to the
citizens-soldiers, the posse, remained the same; the posse should not
be subject to any law other than ordinary civilian standards of due
process of law.
B. From American Colonial Development and the Revolutionary
War to the Civil War
By the eighteenth century, new colonial charters reflected the
Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, and the Riot Act.s4 The colonies
were all but precluded from martial law to deal with domestic dis-
orders of lesser gravity than open armed rebellion, tantamount to civil
war. Furthermore, martial law was to be avoided even under circum-
stances of insurrection or rebellion, unless "necessity" required it.
"Necessity" meant that the civil government no longer functioned and
military force was essential for the survival of the colonies."5
The American Revolutionary War was the eventual result of En-
gland's disregard for these basic tenets of English law. But, the prin-
ciples of due process, subordination of the military, and, restrictions
on the use of martial law were to be clearly remembered when the
framers of the Constitution met in Philadelphia.
At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, the delegates
addressed themselves to the problems of dealing with domestic vio-
lence. After extended discussion, the committee of the whole presented
to the Convention a recommended clause aimed at resolving this prob-
lem.56 This proposal called for the federal government to secure
52 Engdahl, supra note 2, at 17.
3 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 441-45.54 Engdahl, supra note 2, at 22-31.
55 The Boston Massacre is a clear example of the misuse of this principle.
To most of the colonists, their status as Englishmen was of primary importance
during the period preceding the Revolutionary War. They considered them-
selves to be faithful to the Crown. This attitude underlined the gravity of the
Boston Massacre because English soldiers had murdered English civilians in
time of peace. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 22-31.56 There were several recommendations as to how the power of the Repub-
lic should be used to insure domestic peace. Some of the delegates favored
leaving the states to defend themselves. Others thought the national govern-
ment should have the power to quell insurrection without any need for a spe-
cific declaration to that effect. Edmund Randolph of Virginia proposed the
"guaranty clause" to the Convention and declared it to have two purposes:
firstly, to secure Republican Government and secondly, to suppress domestic
commotions. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 35-42.
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republican government for the states, and was embodied as the "guar-
anty clause" in the Constitution. It provides:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature can-
not be convened) against domestic Violence. 7
In light of this provision, it has been asserted that any state is
precluded from declaring martial law, even in the face of necessity.58
It is contended that since the federal government is obligated to secure
republican government for each state, questions relating to the neces-
sity of utilizing military force to secure a state from invasion, war, and
domestic violence are purely federal questions that should be decided
by federal authorities.59
It was also necessary to assure the populace that the military
57 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.58 Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National Emergency, 55
HAxv. L. REv. 1253, 1266 (1942). Fairman reasons:
Whatever the law of the state may be, every exercise of martial
rule by state officers presents at least potentially a federal question.
Where the governor has declared or has acted upon the view that a
condition of war exists, the question arises how a state can constitu-
tionally wage war in the face of Article I, Section 10, Clause 3 ....
The theory of the Constitution seems to be that if matters came to
such a pass [as provided in above cited provision] the remedy would
be for the authorities of the state to invoke Article IV, Section 4,
wherein the United States guarantees every state a republican form of
government and protection against invasion and domestic violence.
Id.
In State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, the dissenting opinion stated:
That guaranty speaks plainly .... Does the State for its preservation
need methods so at variance with constitutional guaranties as is mar-
tial law when it may obtain the power of the Union to suppress even
domestic violence? Can not the militia and the United States army
pacify any section of the State, or the whole State, by methods strictly
within the Constitution and laws? It was so believed when the Fed-
eral government was formed.
71 W. Va. 519, 533, 77 S.E. 243, 249 (1912) (Robinson, 1.J., dissenting opinion).
59 Fairman, supra note 58, at 1266. It has likewise been argued that since
(1) only the Congress can suspend the writ of habeas corpus, the executive
can never accomplish this; (2) the military power must at all times, even in
invasion and insurrection be subordinate to the civil; a fortiori in suppression
of lawlessness merely local; (3) in consonance with the foregoing, the military
power of the state can only be used to aid the civil power. Since the writ can-
not be suspended by the executive, then the executive cannot declare martial
law because such action and suspension of the writ must accompany one an-
other. Grant, Suspension of the Habeas Corpus in Strikes, 3 VA. L. RaV. 249,
262 (1916). The logical extension of this argument again makes the institution
of martial law a federal question. Since Congress must decide whether or not
the writ is to be suspended, only Congress should logically have authority to
invoke martial law.
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would remain subordinate to the civil government. 0 Historical anal-
ysis of the ratifying process in the several states and the demand for a
Bill of Rights support the position that the fifth amendment's due
process clause implies subjection of the military to civil power.6'
Using its militia power, the first Congress addressed itself to clari-
fication of the federal government's power to suppress "invasions" or
"insurrections" at the request of an affected state's chief executive.62
In the succeeding years until the Civil War, whenever regular military
troops or portions of the militia were utilized, they were generally em-
ployed as part of the posse comitatus3 (not as soldiers, but as civilian
aids supplementing, but always subordinate to, regular civil officers
in enforcing normal civil laws).64 Only where civilian governments
were undeniably engaged in a bona fide struggle for survival, were
soldiers used as soldiers to restore the peace. 65 Only in such instances
were soldiers subject to military law and discipline, and only then did
the military function as the government. Martial law was the law of
necessity.
66
60 See Tm FEDERALIST Nos. 8, 25, 26, 27, 29 (A. Hamilton); THE FED-
ERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison).
61 Engdahl, supra note 2, at 40-43. Engdahl's conclusion is that the first
Congress, in promulgating the Bill of Rights, was satisfied that the due process
claus& of the fifth amendment was an effective safeguard against potential
military oppression. This concept of due process, briefly stated, is that an in-
dividual may not have criminal sanctions visited upon him by the government
unless ordinary legal procedures are followed. The absence of ordinary legal
procedures, occasioned by the destruction or temporary indisposition of the
civil government, is a prerequisite to institution of martial law. See also FAIR-
MAN, supra note 16, at 29-50.62 See Note, Riot Control and the Use of Federal Troops, 81 HAIv. L.
Rnv. 638 (1968).
63 Engdahl, supra note 2, at 31-35. This was similar to the doctrine pro-
mulgated by Lord Mansfield in 1780 in England to justify his use of soldiers
against English citizens during the "Lord Gordon Riots." The doctrine was
based on the ancient law and tradition that required every able man in the
realm to serve in the posse. Thus, a member of the military could be called
to aid a sheriff or magistrate, "not as soldiers, but as citizens." The distinguish-
ing factor was that when called as a civil peace-keeping force, these individ-
uals were subordinate and obedient to the civil authorities. See Rex v. Pinney,
5 Car. & P. 254, 172 Eng. 962 (1832).
64Engdahl, supra note 2, at 50.
6sThese instances were Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts in 1786, the
Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania during 1794, and the Dorr Rebellion in
Rhode Island in 1842. Even in Rhode Island, where there was an authentic
armed rebellion, and the use of martial law was upheld, the Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of reasonableness remained applicable. See
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849).
66 "Martial law is the law of military necessity in the actual presence of
war." United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 526 (1875). RANKIN, supra
note 17, at 173. However, the Supreme Court and numerous state courts clearly
indicated that soldiers and militiamen were personally liable for official acts
committed against civilians, in violation of civilian laws, even though done
pursuant to military orders. See, e.g., Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 330
[Vol. 75
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 75, Iss. 2 [1972], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol75/iss2/7
STUDENT NOTES
C. From the Civil War to the Present
On several occasions during the Civil War, Union soldiers were
utilized in a manner that either disregarded or superseded the ordinary
civil law.67 The United States Supreme Court addressed itself to this
situation in Ex parte Milligan.68 Milligan, a civilian Indiana citizen was
arrested, tried, and sentenced to death by a military commission estab-
lished pursuant to a presidential proclamation of martial law.69 At the
time of his trial, civilian, state, and federal courts were fully function-
ing in Indiana. On Milligan's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
court addressed itself to the question of whether martial law could be
instituted before civil government had ceased to function. 70 In a split
decision, Milligan was ordered released.7' The majority held that in the
absence of necessity for martial law in Indiana, substitution of sum-
mary military proceedings for the procedure guaranteed in civilian
courts could not be allowed. 72 As to the necessity for imposing martial
law, the Court observed that there were no hostile forces presently in
(1806); Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns. 424 (N.Y. 1814). Contra, Commonwealth
ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 A. 952 (1903), holding that
when the militia [National Guard] "are in active service for the suppression of
disorder and violence, their rights and obligations must be judged by the
standard of actual war." Id. at 174, 55 A. at 956.
67 The Civil War brought about numerous occasions where resori was
made to martial law, either by Presidential proclamation or by the action of
field military commanders pursuant to delegation of such authority by the
President. In September, 1862, Presidential proclamation made subject to mar-
tial law not only insurgents, but also alders and abettors within the United
States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia
drafts, or guilty of any disloyal acts. R. WnmrmoP, Murr y LAw AND PRE-
CEDENTS 823 (2d ed. 1920). General Fremont declared and established martial
law in the city and county of St. Louis in 1861; martial law was variously
declared in whole or parts of Kansas, Missouri, Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and most occupied areas. Id. at 824-27. See also FAmmNw, supra note 16,
at 162-97; Fairman, supra note 58, at 1278-89.
6871 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). The Milligan decision has been widely
commented upon. See FAuRMAN, supra note 16, at 138-44; RANKIN, supra note
17, at 53-64. The traditional military view of this decision is expressed in R.
WmNTmoP, supra note 67, at 817-18. Contemporary discussion can be found
in Engdahl, supra note 2, at 54-56; Study, supra note 40, at 421-30.
69 See note 67, supra. For general discussion of military commissions, i.e.,
"the tribunals of martial rule" see FAmMAN, supra note 16, at 197-205; R.
WnrrRoP, supra note 67, at 831-46.
70 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124-25 (1866).
7' Id. The Court agreed unanimously that Congress had not meant to sub-
ject political prisoners to trial by military commission, that there had been no
clear necessity to justify the executive's assumption of powers beyond those
conferred by Congress, and that Milligan was subject to the statute. Fairman,
supra note 58, at 1285.
7271 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). The Court stated that the right to
jury trial "is not held by sufferance, and cannot be frittered away on any plea
of state or political necessity." Id. As to the guarantees of the Constitution,
"Not one of these safeguards can the President, or Congress, or the Judiciary
disturb, except the one concerning the writ of habeas corpus" Id. at 125.
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Indiana. Furthermore, "[I]f once invaded, that invasion was at an end,
and with it all pretext for martial law. Martial law cannot arise from
a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the
invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the
civil administration."73 The majority particularized the instances that
might justify institution of martial law:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually
closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice ac-
cording to law, then, on the theatre of active military opera-
tions, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to
furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown,
to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no
power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by
martial rule until the laws can have their free course....
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdic-
tion.74
The majority decision was based on the general concept of due
process and on several specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights.7s The
concurring justices would have permitted martial rule not only in time
of war, but at other periods of "public danger."" They deemed the
731d. at 126-27.
741d. at 127. The requirement of actual "war" in Milligan and the dictum
by Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), have
served as the basis for some state courts to grant war powers to a governor.
See note 30, supra.75See note 72, supra. In sweeping terms, the Court declared:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protec-
tion all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No
doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented
by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120-21. The thrust of Milligan is that martial law is not
a special application of constitutional due process. Instead, it is a concept that
has no meaning unless the legal limitations of due process are discarded, i.e.,
the civil courts are closed. The simplest meaning of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments is that the government may not place criminal-type sanctions upon
an individual without first complying with ordinary legal procedures. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin, What Has The Supreme Court Taught?, 72 W. VA. L. Rnv. 326,
381-94 (1970). Martial law means "the individual has no enforceable legal
right to a definable area of freedom from government action; this protected
area was the essence of due process to the Milligan Court." Study, supra note
40, at 423.
7671 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140-41. The concurring opinion reasoned that the
Constitution allows for both military and civil government. Congress has ple-
nary power to govern the military, and this was not affected by provisions of
the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, Congress is authorized to raise and support
armies and to declare war. Consequently, when the nation is at war, it is
[Vol. 75
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ability of the civil courts to function in times of public danger not
controlling against the institution of martial law since they "might be
open and undisturbed in the execution of their functions, and yet
wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger, or to punish, with
adequate promptitude and certainty, the guilty conspirators."7 Essen-
tially, MUlligan stands for two propositions: First, martial law is only
justified in the absence of a functioning civil government; second, the
necessity of imposing martial law is a judicially reviewable question.
Another important consideration to modem analysis of Milligan in-
volves application of the theory of "incorporating." The Bill of Rights
selectively is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment, making
the vigorous limitations imposed on the actions of military troops
applicable to, and binding upon, current state actions.78
Immediately following Milligan, lower courts adhered to the
pre-civil war principles affirming the military's subordination to the
civil government .7  Extra-judicial concepts, however, were in the
process of changing.80 Executives and legislatures in both federal and
state governments were reassessing traditional precepts.8' Specifically,
military forces were increasingly used as "soldiers" and not as part
within the constitutional authority of Congress to designate in what districts
such imminent public danger exists to justify military trials. "It was for Con-
gress to determine the question of expediency." Id. See also FAmmAN, supra
note 16, at 142.
7771 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 140-41 (1866). The dissenting opinion defined
martial law:
[Martial law is] to be exercised in time of invasion or insurrection
within the limits of the United States, or during rebellion within the
limits of States maintaining adhesion to the National Government,
when the public danger requires its exercise... and is called into ac-
tion by Congress, or temporarily, when the action of Congress cannot
be invited, and in the case of justifying or excusing peril, by the Pres-
ident, in times of insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war,
within districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately
secures public safety and private rights.
Id. at 142.78 See Study, supra note 40, at 426.79 See, e.g., Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (No. 9605) (C.C.D. Ind.
1871); McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235 (No. 8673) (C.C.D. Cal. 1867);
In re Egan, 8 F. Cas. 367 (No. 4303) (C.C.N.D. N.Y. 1866); Johnson v.
Jones, 44 Ill. 142 (1867).8? See, e.g., Ex parte Moore, 64 N.C. 802 (1870). The Governor of North
Carolina invoked martial law and apprehended and jailed a number of prison-
ers. The court's return of the writ of habeas corpus ordering the prisoners to
be released was ignored by the Governor. See also, Ex parte Kerr, 64 N.C. 816
(1870); Engdahl, supra note 2, at 60-63.
81 In order to strengthen the authority of carpetbagger governments and
provide the President with increased power to quell anti-Negro violence in the
south, the Reconstruction Congress passed the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871. 10
U.S.C. § 333 (1970). This Act was the basis for federal intervention in racial
disturbances in the south where a state was unable, refused, or failed to pro-
tect constitutional rights.
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of a posse, which is subordinate to civilian laws and governmental offi-
cials." Following the lead of Congress, state legislatures adopted this
trend.83 By the turn of the century, such concepts, in direct contraven-
tion to the precedents of centuries of Anglo-American law, were
receiving vigorous approval by many courts.14
The Supreme Court specifically condoned this trend in Moyer v.
Peabody." In Moyer, the Governor of Colorado had determined that
an insurrection existed in the face of a violent labor strike, but had
neither declared martial law nor suspended the writ of habeas corpus.
Moyer was summarily arrested and imprisoned by order of the Gov-
ernor. Upon his release from imprisonment, he commenced an action
for damages against the officer who executed the order and the Gov-
ernor who had approved it.86 The Court stated that what is due
process of law depends on the circumstances and held that "the Gov-
ernor's declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of
that fact." 7 It conceded that the executive has nearly total discretion
in its exercise of emergency powers, both in declaring an emergency
and deciding how it shall be met.88 Heretofore, the existing standard
s2 Study, supra note 40, at 410-12; See also Engdahl, supra note 2, at 62-
65. Congress made sweeping changes in the Federal Posse Comitatus Act in
1878. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 145. Federal marshalls and
other federal officials were prohibited from using federal troops as a posse.
This was a reaction to the over use of the military as soldiers, especially dur-
ing the election of 1876. (It has been suggested, however, that Congress should
merely have emphasized the posse's subordination to civil law and authorities.)
Study, supra note 40, at 412. However, statutes authorizing the President to
use federal troops remained unchanged. With the abolition of the military as
part of the posse, the implication was that federal troops were to be employed
in domestic disorders as "soldiers." Id.
83 Study, supra note 40, at 412. For instance, where the militia had been
used as part of the posse of the sheriff or at the call of local and county offi-
cials, these changes conferred upon the Governor the sole power to activate
and use the militia. This power conferred and authorized use of the militia as
an independent force. Engdahl, supra note 2, at 63. Consequently, the prin-
ciple of subordination of the military to the civil power no longer implied
that if the military was used to enforce civilian laws, the troops were subject
to the control of the civilian authorities and held to the ordinary standards of
due process of law. The only requirements were that the militia be under the
command of the commander-in-chief, who was also the chief executive of the
civilian regime. Id.84 See, e.g., In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85 P. 190 (1904); In re Boyle, 6
Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Boyle v. Sinclair,
178 U.S. 611 (1900); Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa.
165, 55 A. 952 (1903); Chapin v. Ferry, 3 Wash. 386, 28 P. 754 (1891).
85212 U.S. 78 (1909).
86 Id. at 84.
87 Id. at 83. The Court indicated that the choice of what measures to take
during an emergency was an exercise of political power by the Governor. As
such, it was beyond review by the judiciary, so long as the Governor's choice
and action was made in good faith. Id.
88 Id. at 85. "Moyer is basically a case which legitimates the expediency
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had limited the state's powers to meet emergencies to no more than
was necessary under the circumstances. 9 Moyer substituted it with an
undefined good-faith standard. 0 This standard, while destined to
become the minority view, was followed by a number of states; it was
used to justify the use of federal and state troops to quell domestic
disturbances, most of which were the outgrowth of labor disputes'
The Moyer standard of good faith was substantially modified by
the Court in Sterling v. Constantin12 Texas oil and gas producers had
organized to produce oil in violation of state conservation statutes.
The ordinary civil authorities could not compel them to stop. Pursuant
to purported threats of violence, the Governor proclaimed a state of
insurrection, imposed a state of martial law, and used the military to
stop the oil production. 3 The oil producers sought a restraining order,
and the Governor defended on the basis of Moyer v. Peabody. The
Court modified the Moyer decision, calling for detailed scrutiny of
governmental response to an emergency; it required a showing of
"direct relation" between the actions taken and the goal of restoring
order.9 4 Furthermore, the Court held that the Governor's declaration
of necessity is conclusive of that fact, but the measures employed are
reviewable by the courts.9 5 Generally, the Court has continued to
follow the "direct relation" test.
96
of military force in enforcing the law in extreme situations; it relegates the
rights of individuals in these situations to secondary importance." Study, supra
note 40, at 426.89 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).90Consequently, Moyer is authority for the principle that it is not neces-
sary to have a formal cessation of civil law before military forces can be used
to quell disorder; nor is it necessary in order to deny civilians legal redress or
subject them to the control of the military commander. Study, supra note 40,
at 426-27.
91 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Seymour v. Fisher, 280 F. 208 (D. Neb.
1922): United States ex rel. McMasters v. Wolters, 268 F. 69 (S.D. Tex.
1920); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935); Rose Mfg. Co. v.
Western Union, 251 S.W. 337 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Ex parte McDonald,
49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914).
92 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
93 Id. at 380-85.
94 Id. at 400-01. However, Sterling should be read cautiously because con-
trary to the factual situation in the Moyer case, there was no violence or threat
of violence at the time the Governor proclaimed martial law. Additionally,
there was no bona fide emergency. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In those
cases the Court found a "direct relation" between the emergency that existed
and the measures taken by the government, in upholding detention of Japanese
nationals and their descendants during World War II.
95 287 U.S. at 400-01. It has been suggested that Sterling, in effect, ap-
plied the Milligan principle to all law enforcement situations involving the
military, including civil disturbances. See Study, supra note 40, at 428. It does
seem that Sterling did, in fact, limit Moyer to its precise facts -a restriction
that narrows the scope of its application to a Governor's arrest order issued
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D. West Virginia Interpretation
West Virginia precedent in the area of martial law is unique and
presents three instances where the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals reviewed and approved the use of punitive martial law.97 A
fourth, and later case, narrowed the breadth of the earlier decisions.98
The first such case was State ex rel. Mays v. Brown,99 which arose
out of a protracted period of violence resulting from attempts at
unionization by the coal miners. The Governor proclaimed that a
"state of war" existed in the Cabin Creek district of Kanawha County
and declared that territory to be under martial law.'1D Mays was one
of a number of individuals arrested and tried by a military commission
established pursuant to the Governor's declaration. He was convicted
and sentenced to the state penitentiary. He challenged the legality of
the Governor's action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus.'0 '
The West Virginia court upheld the Governor's authority to declare
to quell an existing insurrection. But see, Valdez v. Black, 446 F.2d 1071 (10th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 963 (1972), citing Moyer for the principle
that the good faith of a guardsman was a complete defense, i.e., good faith
effectively supplants probable cause. This decision has been criticized. See
Waranoff, supra note 2, at 13-15.96 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). The Court held that
the civil courts may not be suspended by the federal government's resort to
martial law. This decision is significant because of the wide variance in judicial
opinions regarding martial law. The majority opinion by Justice Black denied
that martial law can be anything more than military aid to civil authorities.
One concurring opinion, by Justice Murphy, would allow martial law in its
classic sense, but only when the civil courts are unable to function. A second
concurring opinion, by Chief Justice Stone, would require a showing of neces-
sity for both the executive proclamation and actions taken under it. The dis-
senting opinion of Justice Burton with Justice Frankfurter concurring, held
that martial law in the theatre of war could be instituted at the President's
discretion and, therefore, would not be subject to judicial review.
Sterling has been followed in Wilson & Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520
(D. Minn. 1959); Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp. 384 (D. Minn.
1936); Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865 (D. Minn. 1934).97See Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914); Ex parte
Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S.E. 1029 (1913); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71
W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
See also RANmw, supra note 17, at 85-111. "In the history of the United
States, martial law has never been used in so broad a scale, in so drastic a
manner, nor upon such sweeping principles as in West Virginia in 1912-1913
during the Paint Creek trouble . . . it was absolute martial law with all its
force." Id. at 85.
98 Ex parte Lavinder, 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.E. 428 (1921).
99 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912).
100 Id. at 520, 77 S.E. at 244.
101 Id. at 521, 77 S.E. at 244. Petitioner contended that the Governor
lacked the authority to institute martial law, or, in the alternative, that his
power to do so extended only to qualified martial law, subordinate to the civil
jurisdiction. He further argued that the West Virginia constitution prohibited
the writ of habeas corpus from being suspended and military forces from op-
erating superior to civil institutions.
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martial law as well as his power to declare the existence of a state of
war. 02 Moreover, the court reached this decision even though West
Virginia constitutional provisions prohibit the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus and allow no exceptions for invasion and insurrec-
tion. 03 Other constitutional provisions provide that the military should
always be subordinate to the civil power'0 and that no citizen should
ever be tried or punished by any military court if the offense being
tried was cognizable by the civil courts.0 5 The theory espoused by the
court was that the people could not have intended to forfeit the power
of self-preservation by use of the military since such power is an inci-
dent of sovereignty.'06 Therefore, the constitutional limitations must
be read in light of the state's right to preserve itself.'0 r The remedy
available to citizens, where the Governor has abused his power, is the
impeachment process for removal of the executive. 08 The syllabus by
the court states that executive acts are not reviewable by the courts
"while the military occupation continues."'' 9 Furthermore, martial law
could be properly and lawfully imposed even though the civil courts
were open in Kanawha County."0 The court stretched the "good faith"
standard of Moyer to its limits. Martial law in all its power could be
established whenever the Governor deemed it necessary."' Judge
Robinson, relying on principles laid down in Milligan,"2 disagreed
102 Id. at 522-27, 77 S.E. 244-47. This opinion has been described as "one
of the most radical ever given by an American court concerning martial law."
RANmN, supra note 17, at 94.
103 W. VA. CoNsT. art. IH, §§ 4, 10.
1
04W. VA. CONSr. art. II, § 12; See also Governor's Emergency Powers,
supra note 2, at 294.
105W. VA. CONSr. art. VII, § 12.
10671 W. Va. 522, 77 S.E. 245.
The guaranties of supremacy of the civil law, trial by the civil
courts, and the operation of the writ of habeas corpus should be read
and interpreted so as to harmonize with the retention in the executive
and legislative departments of power necessary to maintain the exis-
tence of such guaranties themselves.
Id. at 523, 77 S.E. at 245.
107 Id. at 523, 77 S.E. at 245. "Nothing can be higher in character or more
indispensable than this power of self-preservation." Id.
108 Id. at 525, 77 S.E. at 246. "Any officer of the State may be impeached
for maladministration, corruption, incompetency, gross immorality, neglect of
duty, or any high crime or misdemeanor. The house of delegates has the sole
power of impeachment." W. VA. CoNsr. art. IV, § 9.
109 71 W. Va. at 519, 77 SE. at 244.
1O Id. at 525, 77 S.E. at 246. Thus the court disregarded Milligan, main-
taining that, even though there were courts open, both inside and outside of
the military zone, this fact did "not preclude the exercise of powers here recog-
nized as vested in the executive of the state. These petitioners were arrested
within the limits of the martial zone. There the process of the courts did not
and could not run during the period of military occupation... " Id.
"I RANEN, supra note 17, at 94.
' 12 State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 543-44, 77 S.E. 243, 253
(1912) (dissenting opinion).
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with the majority upon each important point."3 The real differences in
the two views revolved around each side's idea of what constituted a
state of war. ' 4
Three months later in Ex parte Jones,"' the court held that the
principles and conclusions of law announced in State ex rel. Mays v.
Brown, having been reconsidered, after thorough argument and con-
sideration, were approved and affirmed." 6 Again, Judge Robinson
dissented."
7
The next year, the court again considered martial law and exec-
utive power in Hatfield v. Graham. "8 The essence of that opinion is
that so long as there is a disturbance in any part of the state justifying
martial law, the Governor has discretionary power to extend martial
law to any portion of the state to eliminate interference with its
administration." 9 So long as the Governor acts in good faith, his
actions and his subordinates' actions are not reviewable by the civil
courts.' 20
Finally, in Ex parte Lavinder,'2 ' the court narrowed the scope of
113 Id. at 527-51, 77 S.E. at 247-57. Judge Robinson stated that the court's
decision "boldly asserts that the sacred guaranties of our State Constitution
may be set aside and wholly disregarded on the plea of necessity." Id. at 527,
77 S.E. at 247. Furthermore, the dissent argued that
a declaration of war is not a declaration of martial law. The mere
presence of war does not set aside constitutional rights and the ordi-
nary course of the laws. Civil courts often proceed in the midst of
war.... Martial law rests not on constitutional, congressional, or leg-
islative warrant; it rests on actual necessity. Nothing else can ever au-
thorize it. And that necessity is reviewable by the courts.
Id. at 535, 77 S.E. at 250 (emphasis added).
",4R.UMN, supra note 17, at 96-97. After Judge Robinson's dissent was
read, the majority took the unusual step of filing a supplemental opinion. 71
W. Va. 551-67, 77 S.E. at 257-64.
"s71 W. Va. 567, 77 S.E. 1029 (1913).
116 Id. The opinion included an extensive history of martial law with quo-
tations that, in the court's opinion, substantiated its own interpretation. RANIUN,
supra note 17, at 98.
117 71 W. Va. at 609-25, 77 S.E. at 1047-1054 (dissenting opinion).
I73 W. Va. 759, 81 S.E. 533 (1914).
"19Id. at 765-66, 81 SE. at 536. Since the government is divided into
three seperate branches, the court reasoned that "he [the Governor] must de-
termine for himself the necessity for the exercise of such power as is vested
in him .... Within his constitutional duties and powers he is supreme." Id.
at 766, 81 S.E. at 536. Moreover, "[tlhe necessity for the act is its justification,
and the governor had the discretion to determine whether the necessity there-
for existed ... "' Id. at 767, 81 SE. at 536.
1
2 0 This is an extension of the decisions in Brown and Jones. The Gover-
nor's power to proclaim martial law is extended from a limited zone, to include
all of the state. The court concluded that, "unless his belief is wholly un-
founded, the legality of his act is unquestionable." Id. at 767, 81 S.E. at 536.
Again, Judge Robinson dissented.
121 88 W. Va. 713, 108 S.B. 428 (1921).
[Vol. 75
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the Governor's powers. Instead of denying that the Governor could
declare war, the court drew a line between "actual" and merely
"theoretical" warfare. Until military forces were mobilized and em-
ployed, there could be no actual warfare and no martial law.'22 "IT1he
proclamation of war did not, ipso facto, nor ex proprio vigore, inau-
gurate martial law in Mingo County."'23 Thus, the unchecked discre-
tion of the executive was more narrowly drawn.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The development of martial law indicates that the bastard off-
spring familiar to Americans today is far removed from the initial con-
cept. This does not mean that archaic principles of law should be
rigidly maintained out of a mystical reverence for the past. It means,
rather, individual liberties that have traditionally been protected by
constitutional guarantees should not be discarded at the instance of
expediency or necessity.'24 The states should be able to act to suppress
domestic disorders, riots, and internal disturbances; however, any
such action should be undertaken in accordance with traditional
constitutional concepts that permit soldiers to be utilized as citizens
augmenting the posse comitatus of the local authorities, and not as
soldiers, immune from civilian law.'25 Clearly, the National Guard can
be used to augment local law enforcement personnel, but it should be
permitted to act only to the extent that the civilian law enforcers
themselves are permitted to act. The National Guard should be used
to preserve civil law and order, but it should be subject to liability ac-
cording to the civil laws, as is any other citizen who is a part of the
posse. Accordingly, the personal liability of individual members of the
Guard should be ascertained by the civil courts instead of military
tribunals.1
26
The West Virginia Legislature should undertake to restrict the
chief executive's discretionary authority to maintain law and order
so that it remains within the limits set forth in the West Virginia con-
stitution.' 2z Statutory guidelines and definitions should be formulated
to allow sufficient executive discretion to meet emergency situations
while assuring the preservation of constitutional due process to all
122 Id. at 715, 108 S.E. at 430.
123 Id. at 716, 108 S.E. at 429.
124 Study, supra note 40. See also Engdahl, supra note 2.
125 See note 63, supra. See also Waranoff, supra note 2.
1
2 6 For a full discussion see note 66.
127 W. VA. CONST. art. TIT, § 12; art. VII, § 5.
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citizens.' Furthermore, the judiciary should be given explicit juris-
diction to review executive determinations.'
29
The constitutional predicate for such legislative action is afforded
by the Supreme Court's decision in Milligan with the subsequent de-
velopment of the "incorporation doctrine" as the basis for applying
selected provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.'2 0 Since Moyer was decided before the court began
to "incorporate" the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, it
can be argued that Moyer has been overruled sub sllentio. Further-
more, the court's subsequent decision in Constantin suggests that the
Milligan principle should be applied to all law enforcement action by
the military, including action taken during civil disorders.'3 '
There are several considerations supporting such a conclusion.
First, if the Milligan principle is applied to all law enforcement by
military forces, to permit an exception for civil disorders is patently
inconsistent.12 Second, there is scant reasoned justification for the
conclusion reached by the Moyer court.' Third, it is difficult to justify
protection of property rights in accordance with the requisites of due
process in cases where an insurrection is declared, while not affording
at least equal due process protection to individual liberties in such
instances.21 Finally, there is a contemporary predicate for such legis-
lation because of the increased reliance on the insinuation of military
force into civil disorder for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
law and order. ' "[T]he principle is well-established and recognized
that military force should not be used against civilian populations
except in the circumstances of extreme necessity, and then only in the
degree and for such duration as may be necessary to restore order."",
128 Study, supra note 40, at 431-36. This article drafted the model: "A State
Statute to Regulate the Use of State Militia in Civil Disturbances." It concludes
a provision dealing with limitations on the power of the military when called
by the Governor and a provision formulating guidelines for the proclamation
of martial law.
129 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). The importance of such
a provision is underlined by several recent federal decisions which hold that
executive power to call out the military forces of the state to quell disorder may
not be limited by court order establishing a prior restraint upon its use, and
indicating by way of dicta, that such a decision is not reviewable at any time
by the judiciary. These decisions rely on Moyer, but ignore Milligan. See
Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1972); Bright v. Nunn, 448 F.2d
245 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971).
130 Study, supra note 40.
131 Id. at 428.
132 Id.
13 Id. at 429.
134 Id.
135 See note 14, supra.
136 CIVIw DIsoRDEs, supra note 1, at 156.
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Legislative action consistent with these principles would retain, and
reestablish ancient precepts of due process of law, essential to the
preservation of individual liberties; it will also allow the Governor to
take timely action to preserve domestic tranquility-within the historic
confines of the Constitution.
James E. Roark
23
Roark: Constitutional Law--Martial Law--Preserving Order in the State: A
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1972
